Summary
The /aggregate/:typename endpoint accepted column and group query parameters that were passed verbatim to goqu.L() — a raw SQL literal expression builder — without any validation. This bypassed all parameterization and allowed authenticated users with any valid session to inject arbitrary SQL expressions.
Impact
An authenticated low-privilege user could:
- Extract data from any table via subquery:
(SELECT group_concat(email) FROM user_account) as leak
- Disclose database internals:
sqlite_version(), (SELECT sql FROM sqlite_master)
- Exfiltrate cross-table data via correlated subqueries
The vulnerability was confirmed locally; user_account.email values were extracted via a crafted column parameter by a non-admin user.
Root Cause
goqu.L(userInput) in server/resource/resource_aggregate.go inserted user-supplied query parameters directly into the SQL string with no validation.
Fix (v0.11.4)
All goqu.L() calls on user-controlled input were eliminated and replaced with:
- Structural expression parsing supporting all documented API forms
- Schema-based column validation (column names checked against entity schema via
TableInfo().GetColumnByName())
- Exact-match allowlist for aggregate functions (
count, sum, avg, min, max, first, last) and scalar functions (date, strftime, upper, lower, etc.)
- Safe goqu constructors (
goqu.I(), goqu.SUM(), goqu.Func()) for all generated expressions
allowedTables scope enforcement: qualified column refs (table.col) validated against root entity + explicitly joined tables only
Two additional DoS bugs were fixed in the same commit: uuid.MustParse panic on malformed UUID input and an index-out-of-range panic in ToOrderedExpressionArray on empty sort expressions.
Credits
Reported by @VashuVats.
References
VashuVats Reporter
Summary
The
/aggregate/:typenameendpoint acceptedcolumnandgroupquery parameters that were passed verbatim togoqu.L()— a raw SQL literal expression builder — without any validation. This bypassed all parameterization and allowed authenticated users with any valid session to inject arbitrary SQL expressions.Impact
An authenticated low-privilege user could:
(SELECT group_concat(email) FROM user_account) as leaksqlite_version(),(SELECT sql FROM sqlite_master)The vulnerability was confirmed locally;
user_account.emailvalues were extracted via a craftedcolumnparameter by a non-admin user.Root Cause
goqu.L(userInput)inserver/resource/resource_aggregate.goinserted user-supplied query parameters directly into the SQL string with no validation.Fix (v0.11.4)
All
goqu.L()calls on user-controlled input were eliminated and replaced with:TableInfo().GetColumnByName())count,sum,avg,min,max,first,last) and scalar functions (date,strftime,upper,lower, etc.)goqu.I(),goqu.SUM(),goqu.Func()) for all generated expressionsallowedTablesscope enforcement: qualified column refs (table.col) validated against root entity + explicitly joined tables onlyTwo additional DoS bugs were fixed in the same commit:
uuid.MustParsepanic on malformed UUID input and an index-out-of-range panic inToOrderedExpressionArrayon empty sort expressions.Credits
Reported by @VashuVats.
References